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ABSTRACT: The common ground in an inquiry consists of what the participants agree on, at least for the 
sake of the inquiry.  The relations between the factual and linguistic components of common ground are 
notoriously difficult to trace.  I clarify them by exploring how modal disagreements – disagreements about 
how things might be – interact with the linguistic and the factual common ground. I argue that modal 
agreement is essential to common ground of any kind. 
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I will begin my discussion of common ground and modal disagreement with an 
illustration of the complex interactions between beliefs about meaning and beliefs about 
the facts. Andy, Bob and Charles are discussing American politics, when Andy says, 
‘Cheney is a vet. He served in Vietnam.’ Bob and Charles dispute this, both saying 
‘What? Cheney is not a vet.’ But while Andy and Bob mean veteran by ‘vet’, Charles 
means veterinarian. We know how to describe these disagreements, and even what it 
takes to resolve them. Andy and Bob agree on the meaning of ‘Cheney is a vet’, but 
disagree about the facts while Andy and Charles disagree about the meaning of that 
sentence, but may otherwise agree on the facts. But now along comes Donald who says 
‘Cheney might have served in Vietnam, but he is not a vet.’ Donald believes, as he would 
put it, that only women can be veterans. As he sees it, it is impossible, and not just false, 
that Cheney should be a veteran. Superficially, this disagreement looks just like the one 
between Andy and Charles. But I will argue that this disagreement, like all modal 
disagreements, cannot be resolved rationally because the common linguistic ground 
needed to resolve it rationally cannot be found. 
I will start by saying some familiar things about common ground, but I will do it 
within a framework of possible worlds, which might not be so familiar. I find this abstract 
framework helpful for thinking about the notion of the common ground in an inquiry and 
for helping to describe the ways in which linguistic and non-linguistic disagreements 
interact. I will use it show that resolving factual disagreements requires linguistic 
agreement on meaning and that resolving linguistic disagreements requires modal 
agreement. We will then be in a position to see why disagreements about what is possible 
cannot rationally be resolved. (My discussion of common ground relies on the 
discussions in (Stalnaker 1974), (Lewis 1979) and (Stalnaker 2002).) 
The common ground in an inquiry is what all sides agree to agree on, what they 
are presupposing, for the sake of the inquiry. Something does not need to be believed by 
the participants for it to be common ground; it need only be accepted for the purposes at 
hand. I might agree for the sake of an argument that Cheney is a patriot and this would 
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make his being a patriot part of the common ground, even though I might continue to 
believe that he is not really patriotic. So long as we all agree to agree on it, then it is part 
of the common ground. This agreement need not be explicit; much of the common 
ground in an inquiry will be stuff that all sides simply take for granted is taken for 
granted. 
The common ground in an inquiry involves a kind of mutual agreement on the 
facts, on what is the case. This means that the common ground determines a set of truth 
conditions: the way things would have to be for them to be as those in the inquiry are 
agreeing to take them to be. We can think of the truth conditions determined by the 
common ground as a set of possible worlds: it is the set of possible worlds where things 
are as they are presupposed to be. This set also represents the questions that remain open 
in a discussion and it can help us to describe and understand the interactions between 
factual, linguistic and modal disagreements. 
But before I get to that, let me say a bit about the notion of a possible world. For 
my purposes, talk about possible worlds is just fancy talk about how things might be or 
might have been. To say that there is a possible world where Dick Cheney is a 
veterinarian is just a fancy way of saying that Dick Cheney might have been a 
veterinarian. We should think of a possible world as a maximally complete way that 
things might have been or might be; sort of like an alternate universe with a complete 
history. Possible worlds are distinct one from another when something is true of one but 
not the other. I find the notion of a possible world to be very useful for describing and 
raising questions about the phenomena of common ground. I think that it enables insights 
that are otherwise hard to obtain. But the notion will not be doing any substantive 
theoretical work in what follows. 
I said that the common ground in a discussion can be represented by a set of 
possible worlds. (The set is sometimes called the “context set.”) The worlds in that set 
will be similar in some respects and different in others. The similarities represent the 
common ground, what all the participants agree to, what they are presupposing in the 
inquiry.  The differences among the worlds in the set represent the open questions, the 
possibilities they have not yet decided on. If all of the worlds are ones where Dick 
Cheney is a Republican, then his being a Republican is common ground; if he is a 
Republican in some but not others, then it is an open question whether he is. The 
participants agree (if only for the sake of the inquiry) that the actual world is one of the 
worlds in the set, but it is an open question just which world it is. As the inquiry proceeds 
and open questions are answered, the set of possible worlds is whittled down. Ideally, 
inquiry ends only when there is but one world remaining. 
When the participants use linguistic resources to pursue the inquiry, the common 
ground will include some linguistic common ground. The participants will agree on how 
to use some of their shared linguistic resources to state what they are presupposing and to 
describe the possibilities that remain open. The common ground includes not just 
agreement on which objects have which properties, but also agreement on how to use 
their words to say which objects have or might have which properties. We can represent 
this feature of the common ground using the set of possible worlds, but it will be helpful 
to make a simplifying assumption. It is well known that our use of language is context-
dependent, and that sentences can be used to say different things, to express different sets 
of truth conditions on different uses. Consequently, there is debate among theorists over 
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what semantic properties sentences have. Some deny that sentences are true or false, 
insisting that it is what speakers say with sentences that is true or false. This debate is 
familiar, but irrelevant for my purposes here. I will simply assume that agreeing on the 
meaning of a sentence involves agreeing on its truth conditions, on how things would 
have to be for that sentence to be true. 
Given the simplifying assumption that sentences are true or false, it follows that 
sentences determine truth conditions, and we can represent a sentence’s truth conditions 
using possible worlds. For instance, the sentence ‘Cheney is a vet’ is true with respect to 
some worlds and false (or at least not true) with respect to others. Its meaning draws a 
division or a distinction among possible worlds, between those with respect to which it is 
true and those with respect to which it is false. We can think of agreement on the 
meaning of a sentence as agreement on what division its meaning draws among those 
possible worlds. A disagreement over that division is sufficient for disagreement over its 
meaning. 
Suppose that it is common ground in a discussion that the sentence ‘Cheney is 
VP’ is true just in case Cheney is VP. In that case, every world in the set is one where 
that sentence draws the very same distinction among the worlds in that set. The 
participants may not agree over which of the worlds in the set is the actual one, but they 
do agree that whichever world is actual, it is one where that sentence draws that 
distinction in the set. Suppose further that it is an open question in that inquiry whether 
Cheney is in fact VP. In that case, some of the worlds in the set are ones where he is VP, 
and so where that sentence is true, while the rest are ones where he is not VP and so 
where that sentence is false. 
I have been describing how the common ground in an inquiry can be represented 
by a set of possible worlds, and have extended this to the common linguistic ground. The 
common ground is represented by what all the worlds in that set have in common. The 
open questions in the inquiry are represented by the differences among those worlds. The 
open questions might include factual ones. It might be an open question whether Cheney 
has violated his oath of office. But the open questions might also include linguistic ones. 
It might be an open question among them what a certain word means, or how it is to be 
used, or what division among the worlds a given sentence draws. Their goal as inquiry 
proceeds is to narrow down the remaining factual and linguistic possibilities until only 
one is left. 
Let me make one last point about the abstract structure of common ground. It is a 
factual matter what the common ground is in a given discussion. This means that it is 
possible for participants in an inquiry to be mistaken about what the common ground is. 
A participant might think something is being presupposed when in fact it is not. The 
mistake may concern what is presupposed about the facts, about whether Cheney is 
patriotic, say, or it might concern what is presupposed about how to say what those facts 
might be, about what the word  ‘Cheney’ or ‘vet’ means. 
Now that I have described how to think about common ground within the possible 
worlds framework, I want to use that framework to help us distinguish and understand the 
three kinds of disagreements in my introductory story. The disagreement between Andy 
and Bob is the most straightforward. They agree about what the sentence ‘Cheney is a 
vet’ means but disagree over whether it is true. In terms of the abstract framework of 




possibilities, but they disagree over which side of that division the actual world is on. In 
every world in the set that represents their common ground, that sentence is true just in 
case Cheney is a veteran, but in some of those worlds he is a veteran and the sentence is 
true while in others he is not and the sentence is false. To resolve their disagreement, they 
need to do further work to decide that open factual question. 
The disagreement between Andy and Charles is more complex and illustrates the 
point that resolving factual disagreements requires linguistic common ground. It is a more 
complex disagreement since it involves a mistake about the common ground. More 
specifically, it involves a mistake about the linguistic common ground. Andy thinks that 
the sentence ‘Cheney is a vet’ is true just in case Cheney is a veteran, but Charles thinks 
that it is true just in case Cheney is a veterinarian. They disagree over what division that 
sentence draws among possible worlds. Moreover, each side thinks that its view of that 
sentence’s meaning is common ground. Andy thinks that every world in the common 
ground is one where it is true just in case Cheney is a veteran whereas Charles thinks that 
every world in that set is one where it is true just in case Cheney is a veterinarian. This 
difference over the common ground is a recipe for investigative frustration for it makes a 
merely terminological disagreement look like a substantive factual one. Despite their 
apparent disagreement, Charles might well agree with Andy that Cheney is a veteran and 
not a veterinarian. They might agree on the facts even though they disagree over how to 
state them. Until they come to agree on how their words draw a distinction among the 
possibilities, they will find it impossible to agree on what the facts are. 
The difficulty that Andy and Charles face illustrates why the meanings of our 
words must in a certain way be independent of the facts. If the meanings of our words 
depend on the facts, then we cannot know what our sentences mean until we know 
whether they are true. But we cannot know whether they are true until we know what 
they mean. We can put this difficulty in terms of possible worlds. If the meaning of a 
sentence varies from one world to another in the common ground, then we cannot agree 
on whether it is true until we agree on which world in the common ground is the actual 
world. But how can we agree on which world we are in unless we first agree on how to 
describe the worlds we might be in? To agree on which world is the actual world we must 
first agree on how to distinguish one world from another. 
I have suggested that meaning must be independent of the facts. Of course, the 
meanings of our words are not really independent of the facts. It is after all a contingent 
matter that our words mean what they do. But we can avoid the difficulty that Andy and 
Charles face so long as the words we are using mean the same thing in every world in the 
set that represents our common ground. So long as what our words mean is not among the 
open questions, so long as the meaning of our words is independent of the facts that 
remain to be settled on, then we will avoid their difficulty. 
Andy and Charles can resolve their disagreement if they agree on what is 
possible. Suppose that Charles agrees with Andy about which of the worlds in the set are 
ones where Cheney is a veteran and which are ones where Cheney is a veterinarian. Their 
disagreement would then be a purely linguistic one: it would concern which division that 
sentence draws among the possible worlds left open by their common ground. Once they 
identify this linguistic disagreement, they can recover common ground by recognizing 
that it is an open question among them what that sentence means. From Andy’s 
perspective, recognizing this means adding to the set of worlds ones where Charles is 
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right about the language; from Charles’ perspective it means adding worlds where Andy 
is right about the language. They can then agree on the following conditional: if Andy is 
right about the linguistic facts, then that sentence is true just in case the actual world is 
one where Cheney is a veteran, but if Charles is right about the linguistic facts, then that 
sentence is true just in case the actual world is one where Cheney is a veterinarian. By 
making explicit their linguistic disagreement, they can find the common ground needed to 
state their factual agreement. 
The disagreement between Andy and Charles illustrates the important point that 
resolving disagreements about the facts requires agreement on meaning. The 
disagreement between Andy and Donald which I will now consider illustrates a second 
and more important point: resolving disagreements about meaning requires agreement on 
what is possible. Once we see this, we will be in a position to see why modal 
disagreements cannot be resolved rationally. 
Let me first argue for this second point at an abstract level. Agreeing on the 
meaning of a sentence requires agreeing on which division it draws among a set of 
possible worlds. But if you and I disagree about which worlds are possible, then we will 
disagree about what divisions there are to be drawn among those worlds. If we disagree 
about what divisions there are to be drawn, then there will be some pair of sentences such 
that one of us thinks they draw the same distinction and the other of us thinks they draw a 
different one. Thus, if we disagree about what is possible, then we must also disagree 
about what our words mean, about what they are used to say. But there is more to it. If we 
disagree about what is possible, then we must also disagree about what there is to say, 
and not just about how to say it; we must disagree about which distinctions there are to be 
drawn, and not just about how to draw them. 
This kind of disagreement is illustrated in the dispute between Andy and Donald. 
At first glance, it seems that Donald agrees with both Andy and Bob. He seems to agree 
with Andy that Cheney served in Vietnam, and with Bob that Cheney is not a veteran. 
But there is more to the disagreement. Unlike Andy and Bob, who thinks it is merely 
contingent that Cheney is no veteran, Donald thinks that it is impossible for him to have 
been a veteran, since, as he would put it, only women can be veterans and Cheney could 
not have been a woman. This is a disagreement not just about how things are, and not just 
about how to describe how they are, but about how things might be or might have been. It 
is a modal disagreement. 
Like the disagreement between Andy and Charles, the one between Andy and 
Donald involves a mistake about the common ground. We saw that Andy and Charles 
could recover common ground by making it an open question what it was that Andy said. 
In effect, this adds to the common ground worlds where the linguistic facts are different. 
This retreat to secure common ground allows them to state their linguistic disagreement. 
But Andy and Donald cannot recover common ground by making it an open question 
what the modal facts are, for there is no such thing as adding to the set of worlds ones 
where the modal facts are different in the way we Andy and Bob could add a world where 
the linguistic facts are different. Worlds do not differ one from another in their modal 
facts. Modal facts are not facts about a world at all; they are facts about the relations 
among worlds. To say that something is possible is to say something about the set of 
worlds, not about any world in the set. There is no way for Andy and Donald to retreat to 




To see this in another way, consider what sort of world would have to be added. It 
could not just be a world where Cheney served in Vietnam. The set already contains such 
worlds and Andy and Donald agree on this and may even agree about which ones they 
are. What about a world where Cheney served in Vietnam but is not a veteran? This 
won’t do either. For Andy thinks there are no such worlds, so he cannot agree to add one, 
any more than he could agree to add a world where Cheney is a zebra. (Andy agreed to 
add a world where the linguistic facts are the way Charles takes them to be because Andy 
agrees that such worlds are possible, since we might have spoken that way.) What is 
more, Donald thinks that the set already contains a world where Cheney served in 
Vietnam but is not a veteran, so he cannot agree that one needs to be added. Andy sees no 
way to change the set; Donald sees no need to change it. 
I have been discussing Andy and Donald’s modal disagreement. It is also true that 
they disagree about the linguistic facts. They disagree about which division the sentence 
‘Cheney is a veteran’ draws among the possible worlds in the set. Could they reach a 
conditional linguistic agreement, the way Andy and Charles did? Could they agree on 
this: if the linguistic facts are the way Andy takes them to be, then what Andy said is true 
of those worlds where Cheney served in Vietnam (and perhaps others), but if the 
linguistic facts are the way Donald takes them to be, then what Andy said is false with 
respect to those worlds? No. For it is not just that they disagree about which division that 
sentence draws among the worlds in the set; they disagree about which divisions there are 
to be drawn among the worlds in the set. While Andy and Charles agreed on what there is 
to say, but disagreed about how to say it, Andy and Donald disagree about what there is 
to say. 
Because their disagreement is over what there is to say, and not just over how to 
say it, it is not possible for them to agree on how to state their disagreement. It seems to 
me that under these conditions there is no way to resolve their disagreement rationally. I 
am not sure how to argue for this, but it seems to me that it is impossible to resolve a 
debate rationally unless there is enough common ground for each side in the dispute to 
state their case. To resolve a disagreement rationally, we have to be able to agree on what 
we disagree on. But this is not possible in the dispute between Andy and Donald, since 
Donald sees Andy as trying to draw a distinction he denies exists. The dispute between 
Andy and Donald illustrates that modal disagreement leaves linguistic common ground 
out of reach, and without linguistic common ground there can be no way to agree on what 
the disagreement is about. 
Earlier, we saw that meaning must in a way be independent of truth, since 
otherwise we could not know what our sentences mean without knowing whether they are 
true. There is an analogous moral here: what there is to say must be independent of the 
facts too. If what there is to say depends on the facts, then we could not know whether we 
were saying something without knowing whether we were saying something true. If what 
distinctions there are to be drawn varies from one world to another in the set that 
represents our common ground, then we cannot know whether we are speaking nonsense 
until we know which world we are in. But how can we agree on which world we are in if 
we cannot first agree on when we are speaking nonsense? This is the difficulty facing 
Andy and Donald and anyone else engaged in a modal disagreement. 
I have claimed that modal disagreements cannot be resolved rationally. But they 
can come to an end. They end when one side gives in to the other. Perhaps Donald will 
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simply acquiesce to Andy. This may look like acquiescing to his linguistic usage, as if the 
disagreement was really just a linguistic one after all. But it is not like the case where 
Charles changed his mind on the linguistic facts, and acquiesced to Andy’s usage. For 
Charles changed his mind on how to say things, but not on what there is to be said. If 
Donald acquiesces to Andy, then, from his point of view, he will be changing his mind on 
how to say things, but only because he is also from his point of view changing his mind 
on what there is to say. (We, by the way, are in the same position as Andy: we think that 
there are more things to say than Donald does. Consequently, we cannot use our words to 
accurately report what he thinks he is saying.) 
In arguing that modal disagreements cannot be resolved rationally, I have been 
relying on the notion of a possible world and I have represented common ground and 
meaning using sets of possible worlds. But nothing in what I have said hangs on this. 
Talk of possible worlds and sets of them is helpful for thinking about three basic theses 
each of which can be stated independently of the framework of possible worlds. One is 
that the common ground in a discussion determines truth conditions; the second is that 
the meaning of a sentence determines truth conditions; the third is that agreeing on the 
truth conditions of a sentence requires agreeing on what is possible. The point I have 
been trying to make is that accepting these three basic theses, which I think most 
everyone does, commits one to the somewhat surprising consequence that modal 
disagreements cannot be resolved rationally. The framework of possible worlds merely 
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